Essays in Dignity and Political Economy
These essays are written in dialogue between a human thinker and an AI interlocutor. The thinking is collaborative. The voice and the judgement are human. The form is the argument. There are gaps. Help us fill them.
The manifesto these essays argue toward — Listen to Me — is already published on this blog.
Essay Eight — The Paralysis and the Possible
On Why We Know and Do Nothing, and What Might Be Done About That
Is this you?
You think you are right about most of the important things in politics. You know that inequality is structural rather than meritocratic. Luck and circumstances create the conditions for people worse off than you, not lack of skill or effort. They should be helped. You know that the market is a political construction rather than a natural phenomenon. Big business does bad things. You know that tax needs to go up to pay for all the public goods that have been mutilated by the nasty people. Just not too much of your tax. You know that the climate is being destroyed by a system that externalises its costs onto those least responsible for them. But you still fly on your holiday. You know that hating others for their otherness, or their circumstances, is wrong and solves nothing, You have read the articles in the Guardian. You have liked the correct posts and shared the correct articles and signed the correct petitions. In sum, left leaning and progressive. And you really, really, really hate the ugly, powerful men who rule the world.
And then you pour another glass of Prosecco and carry on as before. You are not alone. I am the same. Minus the Prosecco.
The paralysis of the progressive left is not a mystery. It has a name, a diagnosis, and an intellectual history. What it has been short of is an honest account of what it feels like from the inside, and a serious rather than sentimental account of what the possible actually looks like.
This essay attempts both. It will not be entirely comfortable. The kicking will be gentle, but it will be a kicking. And I will kick myself. And likely fall over. So be it.
Fisher and the Colonised Imagination
Mark Fisher died in 2017, at forty-eight, by his own hand. He had spent his career writing about exactly the condition this essay is trying to describe — with a precision and a personal urgency that academic political theory rarely achieves.
His central concept — Capitalist Realism, the title of his 2009 book — is possibly the most useful single contemporary idea for understanding the paralysis. The argument is this: we live in a moment in which it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. Not because capitalism has solved its contradictions. It manifestly has not — the previous essays in this series have been cataloguing them at some length. But because the system has so thoroughly colonised the imagination that alternatives feel not wrong but simply unreal. Not refuted. Unthinkable. The horizon of the possible has shrunk to the horizon of the existing.
This is not apathy. Apathy is indifference. The progressive paralysis is something more specific and more painful: the combination of acute awareness of what is wrong with the inability to imagine, with any concreteness, what right would look like. Fisher called it reflexive impotence — the knowing that things are bad, the sense that you can’t do anything about it, and the way that this combination becomes self-fulfilling. The person who knows and does nothing has incorporated the system’s verdict on itself into their own expectations.
The system does not need to silence its critics. It needs only to convince them that their criticism cannot change anything. Once that conviction is established, the criticism becomes part of the system’s functioning rather than a challenge to it. The dinner party where everyone agrees things are dreadful and then orders dessert is not resistance. It is, in its small way, collaboration.
Fisher was writing primarily about culture — about how music, film, television and the internet had absorbed the aesthetics of resistance and commodified them, turning rebellion into a lifestyle choice, subversion into a marketing category. The band that looks like it’s challenging the system is selling trainers. The radical text is a bestseller on Amazon. The protest is Instagrammed and hashtagged and the algorithm serves it back as content. Nothing is outside the frame. Everything is available for consumption. The radicalism with nowhere to go is the radicalism that has been safely contained. He wasn’t first to this. He was standing on the shoulders of Gramsci, Debord and especially Marcuse.
But Fisher’s insight extends well beyond culture. The political equivalent of Capitalist Realism is the progressive movement that has learned to perform opposition without expecting to achieve it. The party that campaigns on transformation and governs on management. The activist who knows the arguments and cannot connect them to action. The intellectual who diagnoses the crisis with precision and then waits for someone else to resolve it.
A Single Sentence Tour of How We Got Here
The progressive paralysis did not arrive from nowhere. It has an intellectual history and understanding it — even in the compressed, fag-packet form this section intends — is part of what makes it possible to move beyond it. This is not a lecture. It is a map. One (long) sentence each. The reader who wants the full argument can find it in the thinkers themselves.
Gramsci: the dominant class maintains power not primarily through force but by making its worldview common sense — hegemony is the naturalisation of the political, the process by which the existing order comes to feel inevitable rather than chosen. Gramsci was not a pure creature of the left in the tribal sense — he was a precise analyst of power, which is why the right subsequently read him more carefully and more usefully than the left did.
The Frankfurt School — Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse — extended this into culture: the culture industry does not simply entertain but manufactures consent, flattening genuine negation into pseudo-individuality, producing the appearance of variety and choice within a system that is fundamentally uniform and managed. Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man argued that advanced industrial society had colonised not just labour but desire — the very capacity for refusal had been administered away.
Debord: the spectacle — the accumulated images and representations through which modern society presents itself — has replaced genuine social life, converting participation into observation and observation into consumption. The revolutionary act is not the march. It is the refusal of the spectacular form.
Jameson: postmodernism is not a style but the cultural logic of late capitalism — a condition in which historical depth collapses into surface, in which pastiche replaces parody because there is no longer a norm from which to deviate, in which the imagination is so thoroughly saturated by the existing that genuine utopian thought becomes cognitively impossible.
Streeck: democratic capitalism has managed its successive crises — inflation in the 1970s, public debt in the 1980s and 1990s, private debt and money creation since — by buying time, each fix deepening the underlying contradiction while deferring its resolution; the system is more resilient than its critics want to believe, and the honest pessimist is more useful than the sentimental optimist.
Fisher: all of the above crystallised into a single cultural condition — Capitalist Realism — in which the system has become the horizon of the possible, in which even the imagination has been foreclosed, in which it is easier to conceive of planetary extinction than of a different way of organising economic life.
That is the lineage. Six thinkers. Six sentences (give or take). The thread running through all of them is a single question: how does the system reproduce itself in the minds of those it exploits? The answer, in each case, is: more thoroughly than we would like to believe.
The progressive paralysis is the lived experience of that thoroughness.
Three Voices From the Room
Before this essay goes any further it needs to honour three objections that have been thrown at it — and at me personally, in various forms, across various dinner tables and arguments over the years. They deserve to be taken seriously rather than dismissed, because each one contains something true.
The first voice: “Why don’t you get off your fat arse and do something?”
This one has been directed at me specifically, in approximately those terms, and it is not entirely unfair, particularly in the light of the physical fact of my arse. The person saying it is pointing at the gap between understanding and action that the previous section was describing — and pointing at it from the activist’s position rather than the analyst’s. Their argument: the diagnosis without the action is not politics. It is therapy. Expensive therapy, conducted in comfortable surroundings, that changes nothing except perhaps the therapist’s sense of their own seriousness.
They are not wrong. Understanding without action is self-indulgence dressed as rigour. The person who can explain hegemony at dinner and has never turned up to anything is not a revolutionary in waiting. They are a consumer of political ideas, which is a category the culture industry is delighted to service.
The honest response is not to dispute this but to take its full measure and then ask what action actually looks like — which this essay will do in its final movement. The fat arse point stands. The question is what getting off it means when the obvious forms of action have demonstrably not worked.
The second voice: “You lot made the mess. Prosecco time. Why should we bail you out?”
This is the generational objection, and it is the one with the most legitimate grievance behind it. The generation now in its sixties and seventies — my generation — inherited a world of expanding social provision, affordable housing, free higher education, and defined benefit pensions. We voted for the people who began dismantling all of it. Thatcher, Blair. We benefited from asset price inflation that has transferred enormous wealth from younger generations to older ones. And we have, for the most part, continued to benefit while expressing concern.
The anger in this voice is just. The strategic conclusion — disengage, pour the prosecco, let the boomers sort their own mess — is understandable and completely counterproductive. The system that is failing younger generations is the same system that will continue to fail them whether or not their parents feel guilty about it. Opting out is not a solution. It is Capitalist Realism in generational form — the acceptance of the existing as inevitable, dressed as principled refusal.
The honest response: the grievance is legitimate. The political conclusion is a gift to the people who created the conditions being complained about. The task is to build the intergenerational coalition that the system has been deliberately preventing — by setting generations against each other on housing, pensions, and inheritance in ways that serve the interests of those at the top of the asset distribution regardless of age.
The third voice: “Technology and capital got us here. They’ll get us out. Your woke conscience and Soviet-adjacent solutions are unnecessary.”
This is the techno-optimist escape hatch, and it is the most seductive of the three because it contains the most truth. Technology does matter. Capital does drive innovation. The solar revolution — the 90% cost reduction in a decade — is a real and remarkable thing. The mRNA vaccine platform that emerged from decades of publicly funded research and was then scaled by private capital genuinely saved millions of lives. The person saying technology will save us is not entirely wrong.
They are wrong about the mechanism and the timeline. Technology is a tool. It does what it is pointed at. It is currently being pointed, at enormous scale, at maximising engagement metrics, at automating labour to capture productivity gains for capital rather than workers, and at building the infrastructure of surveillance capitalism. The same AI that could accelerate the green transition is being used to reopen coal plants to power data centres. The question is never whether the technology exists. It is always: who controls it, for whose benefit, on what timeline, and with what democratic accountability?
The techno-optimist escape hatch is the most comfortable form of Capitalist Realism: the system that created the problem will solve the problem, we just need to wait and trust the people who are currently extracting maximum value from the problem to eventually fix it. This is not optimism. It is the learned helplessness of people who have decided that agency belongs to someone else.
The Pathologies of the Tribe
The progressive left in Britain has two characteristic pathologies that are related but distinct. The first is the displacement of structural critique by identity politics. The second is the romanticisation of resistance.
On identity and structure. Identity politics — the centering of race, gender, sexuality and other axes of marginalisation in political analysis — emerged from genuine and important insights. The early feminist movement was right that the personal is political. The civil rights tradition was right that racism is structural rather than merely attitudinal. Queer theory was right that sexuality and gender are sites of power rather than private matters. These were advances in understanding, not retreats from it.
The problem came with the inversion. The personal is political became the political is personal — and somewhere in that inversion the structural analysis began to dissolve into the management of individual and group experience. The system discovered that it could accommodate a diverse board of directors considerably more easily than it could accommodate a living wage. The representation of previously excluded groups within existing structures of power is a real advance. It is not the same as changing the structures. A diverse cabinet implementing austerity is still implementing austerity.
Fisher was precise about this — and was attacked for it, sometimes unfairly, sometimes not. His argument was not that identity doesn’t matter. It does. His argument was that when identity becomes the primary frame, class analysis gets displaced — and class is the analysis that the system most needs to prevent. The fragmentation of the progressive coalition along identity lines is not an accident of cultural history. It is the path of least resistance for a left that had lost confidence in structural critique and found, in the politics of recognition, a form of opposition that the system could absorb without fundamental challenge.
This is not a reason to abandon the politics of recognition. It is a reason to hold it alongside the politics of redistribution rather than letting it substitute for it. The two are not alternatives. The care worker who is also a woman of colour experiencing racism at work needs both the structural analysis of care work and the structural analysis of race. The failure to hold both simultaneously is not sophistication. It is a narrowing of vision that serves the status quo.
On romanticised resistance. The march feels like solidarity. The chant feels like power. The placard feels like voice. And it is all of those things — partially, temporarily, in the moment of collective action. The problem is when the feeling becomes the point. When the performance of opposition substitutes for the analysis of what opposition requires. When the aesthetic of radicalism replaces the practice of it.
Debord saw this coming in 1967. The spectacle absorbs everything, including the spectacle of its own critique. The revolutionary image becomes a commodity. The protest becomes content. The radical text becomes a bestseller. None of this invalidates the original impulse — but it does mean that the system has developed sophisticated mechanisms for containing it. The march that arrives, is photographed, is covered, is forgotten, and changes nothing has been successfully processed by the apparatus it was marching against.
The romanticisation of resistance is also, at its worst, a form of the paralysis in disguise. The person who identifies with the long tradition of progressive struggle — who knows their history, who can name their heroes, who experiences the march as a connection to something larger than themselves — can mistake that identification for participation. The emotional experience of solidarity is real. It is not the same as the political practice of building power.
There is also — and this is the uncomfortable part — a class dimension to the romanticisation of resistance that the progressive movement has been reluctant to examine. The aestheticisation of opposition is predominantly a middle-class cultural form. The working-class politics that actually changed things in the twentieth century was not primarily concerned with how resistance felt. It was concerned with what it achieved. The union meeting. The strike fund. The collective agreement. These are not aesthetically exciting. They are structurally effective. The gap between the two is worth examining.
The Cathedral and the Iconoclasts
There is a strand of thought — associated with the Dark Enlightenment, with the tech-billionaire right, with various strains of authoritarian populism — that begins with a correct diagnosis and arrives at a catastrophic prescription.
The correct diagnosis: representative democracy is broken. The institutions that are supposed to hold power accountable, the Guardians of thought — the press, the judiciary, the universities, the civil service — are compromised, captured, slow, and frequently serve the interests of those they are supposed to scrutinise. The political class is self-perpetuating, the parties are convergent, and the ritual of the election changes less than it should. All of this is true.
The catastrophic prescription: therefore, strong man. Therefore, bypass the institutions. Therefore, the people have spoken and the lawyers should sit down. Therefore, the university is the enemy of truth and the press is the enemy of the people and the deep state is the enemy of democracy and the answer to all of these things is concentrated executive power in the hands of whoever has correctly identified the real enemies.
The Dark Enlightenment understands something the paralysed left has been slow to grasp. The Cathedral — to use its own imagery — needs destroying precisely because it is what makes democratic politics possible. The independent judiciary. The free press. The university that can say things power finds inconvenient. The civil service that does not change its institutional memory with each election. The cultural institutions that maintain a space for thought and expression outside the immediate demands of the market and the state.
These institutions are not neutral. They never were. The press has proprietors. The judiciary reflects the class composition of the legal profession. The universities have historically served power as readily as they have challenged it. The civil service has its own interests. None of this is a secret and none of it is an argument for their destruction.
Because what the Dark Enlightenment iconoclasts understand — and what makes them dangerous — is that destroying the Cathedral does not produce a better building. It produces rubble, in which the strongest survives. The institutions beyond the political machine are not the ornaments of democracy. They are the conditions under which democratic argument is possible at all. They are what makes it conceivable that one government can be voted out and replaced by another without the losers being imprisoned. They are what makes it possible for a journalist to publish something a powerful person would prefer suppressed. They are what makes it possible for a court to rule against the state.
The left’s response to broken institutions has too often been either to ignore them or to demand their transformation in ways that inadvertently weaken them. The conservative instinct to defend institutions is not wrong — it is the conservative answer to the right question. The correct progressive answer to the same question is: defend the institutions, reform them, hold them to the standards they claim for themselves, and understand that without them there is no platform from which any other argument can be made.
This is where the left’s self-described radicalism has sometimes been its own enemy. The impulse to tear down what is compromised rather than to reform what is repairable has, in specific historical instances, cleared the ground for something considerably worse. The Weimar Republic was imperfect. What replaced it was not an improvement.
Institution defence is not conservatism. It is not the abandonment of structural critique. It is the recognition that the space within which structural critique can be made, heard, and eventually acted upon requires institutional protection. The iconoclast who destroys the Cathedral in the name of a purer truth has misunderstood what cathedrals are for. They are not claims about God. They have form and function. They are claims about what human communities can build and maintain together across generations. That is worth defending. Even when the specific institution is imperfect. Especially then.
The Grandma in Russia
Representative democracy is broken. This needs to be said plainly rather than evasively, because the evasion — the pretence that the problems are manageable tweaks rather than structural failures — is part of what has produced the paralysis.
The problems are well documented. The convergence of party platforms under the pressure of media and markets. The power of organised money over legislative outcomes. The systematic underrepresentation of certain classes and communities in the institutions that make decisions about them. The short time horizons imposed by the electoral cycle on problems that require generational thinking. The degradation of public deliberation by an information environment optimised for outrage rather than understanding.
The Dark Enlightenment prescription — strong man, bypass the process, the people have spoken — begins here and goes catastrophically wrong. But here the progressive response — defend the existing arrangements, manage them better, wait for the pendulum to swing back — may also be insufficient. Because the existing arrangements are producing outcomes that increasing numbers of people, in increasing numbers of countries, are correctly identifying as inadequate. And people who are correctly identifying inadequacy and being offered nothing in response are available to whoever offers them something, however destructive.
There is a grandma in Russia who loves Putin. She is not stupid. She is not evil. She is not simply the victim of propaganda, though propaganda plays its part. She is a person who lived through the chaos of the 1990s — the looting of public assets, the collapse of institutions, the immiseration of ordinary people while a small number of connected individuals extracted enormous wealth — and who experienced Putin as the person who said: I see you, I am listening, I will impose order on this. Her response is rational. It is a rational response to a genuine experience of not being heard.
The lesson of the grandma is not that people are susceptible to authoritarianism. The lesson is that demagoguery fills the vacuum left by institutions that have stopped listening. The alternative to Putin is not better propaganda about liberal democracy. It is institutions that actually listen. It is the experience of being heard. It is the citizens’ assembly in which your view is solicited and taken seriously. It is the public forum in which the decision that affects your neighbourhood is made with your genuine participation rather than over your head.
Most people, most of the time, given genuine information and genuine voice, arrive at something approximating justice. This is the consistent finding of deliberative democracy research across multiple countries and contexts. The Irish citizens’ assembly on abortion — a randomly selected group of citizens given genuine information, genuine time and genuine deliberative structure — arrived at recommendations that were both more thoughtful and more humane than anything the political system had managed, and which turned out to represent the view of the electorate more accurately than the political class had assumed possible.
People are not the problem. The systems that have stopped treating them as the point are the problem. The manifesto that runs through this series is called Listen to Me for a reason. Not as a demand for attention from an individual who feels overlooked. As a description of what democratic politics requires at its foundation. The person who is genuinely listened to does not need a strongman to amplify their voice. They already have it. From that flows connection, empathy, relationship.
Representative democracy needs not abandonment but supplement and repair. The sortition and the citizens’ assembly — as argued in Essay Four — are not replacements for the ballot box. They are what makes the ballot box meaningful again. They rebuild the listening that the grandma in Russia was denied and that made her available to the person who performed it most convincingly. And they build sustainable change. Politics once again can become the art of the possible rather than the performance of the impossible.
The 3.5% and the Things Between
Erica Chenoweth is a political scientist at Harvard. She and Maria Stephan spent several years analysing 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006. They were looking for what distinguished the ones that succeeded from the ones that failed.
The finding that emerged from the data — and that Chenoweth describes as having surprised her, because she expected violent campaigns to be more effective — is this: no nonviolent campaign that achieved the active participation of 3.5% of the population has ever failed to achieve significant change. Not most of them. Not the majority. Every single one.
3.5% of the UK population is approximately 2.3 million people. It is considerably fewer than voted for the Brexit Party in 2019. It is fewer than attend Premier League matches on a single weekend. It is a number that is, by any reasonable measure, achievable.
The Chenoweth finding does not say that 3.5% active participation guarantees any specific outcome. It says that it has, historically, always been sufficient to force significant change. The caveat is the word active — not passive sympathy, not social media support, not the dinner party agreement that something should be done. Active, sustained, embodied participation. People who show up.
This is the pivot from the paralysis to the possible. Not because 3.5% is easy. Not because the path from here to there is clear. But because it is concrete. It is a number. It is historical evidence rather than utopian aspiration. It names the threshold rather than the destination and lets people work out their own route to it.
The essay has been arguing — and the series has been arguing across eight pieces now — that the things that matter are the things between. Not the grand ideology. Not the nihilism. Not the waiting for the revolution. Not the dinner party agreement. The things between: the neighbour you talk to, the assembly you attend, the institution you defend, the argument you make in public rather than among the already convinced, the question you ask that has no easy answer and that you stay with rather than retreating to the comfortable position.
Fisher’s Capitalist Realism is the diagnosis of a system that has made these things feel pointless. The 3.5% finding is the empirical counter to that diagnosis. The imagination has been colonised — but the colony has been successfully resisted before, repeatedly, by people who were also living inside it and who also had every reason to believe that nothing could change.
Streeck’s honest pessimism is not refuted by Chenoweth. The system is resilient. The structural obstacles are real. The timeline is long. All of this is true and should be held without illusion. Honest pessimism and active participation are not contradictory. They are the combination that serious politics requires — the clear-eyed understanding of what you are up against, held simultaneously with the refusal to accept that understanding as a reason to do nothing.
The romanticisation of resistance is the failure to hold both. The sentimental optimist believes that the march will change things because change is inevitable and history is on our side. The honest pessimist who is also active does not believe history is on anyone’s side. They believe that the 3.5% threshold is achievable, that it has worked before, and that the alternative to trying is the grandma in Russia — the rational response to not being heard, which is to support whoever performs the listening most convincingly, consequences be damned.
The Stoic Choice
The series has a manifesto called Listen to Me. The manifesto has a closing movement called The Stoic’s Conclusion. This essay has been working toward the same place from a different direction — from inside the paralysis rather than from above it.
The Stoic insight — available from Marcus Aurelius through to Camus — is that the question of whether action will succeed is separate from the question of whether to act. The Stoic does not act because the outcome is guaranteed. The Stoic acts because acting, under the conditions of genuine understanding of what one is facing, is what the situation requires of a person who takes it seriously. The alternative — understanding and not acting — is not a neutral position. It is a choice in favour of the existing.
Fisher understood this. He diagnosed the paralysis with extraordinary precision and could not, in the end, find his way out of it personally. That is not a failure of his argument. It is a testament to how real the thing he was describing is. The colonised imagination is not a metaphor. It is a material condition that has material consequences for the people living inside it. Fisher lived inside it and wrote about it from the inside, and the cost was enormous.
The essay is not going to pretend that getting off your fat arse is simple. The first voice was right that it is necessary. It did not say it was easy. The Capitalist Realism that Fisher described is not dispelled by an essay. It is a cultural condition that requires cultural counter-work — the slow, patient, unglamorous work of building the institutions, the habits of mind, the civic education, the deliberative practices, the 3.5% — that make an alternative not just thinkable but liveable.
Not a blueprint. A direction. Not a guarantee. A threshold. Not a revolution. A walking dialectic that starts from where you are, asks the questions, confounds where necessary, and rinses and repeats.
The bond trader has a mother and a garden and sings in the bath. The grandma in Russia loves her grandchildren and wants them to be safe. The person shouting about prosecco time is right about the grievance and wrong about the response. The fat arse objector is right about the necessity and impatient about the form. The techno-optimist is right that tools matter and wrong about who holds them.
None of these people are the enemy. The system that has convinced most of them that nothing can be different — that is the enemy. And the system is not a person. It is a set of arrangements. Arrangements can be rearranged.
That is the possible. Not utopia. Not the end of history in the other direction. The concrete, achievable, evidenced possibility that 3.5% of people, actively and sustainedly participating in the direction of something better, have never failed to move the needle. That civic education can build the thinking that the sortition requires. That the Cathedral can be defended and reformed rather than surrendered to the iconoclasts or abandoned as compromised. That the grandma deserves to be heard rather than patronised or dismissed. That the walking dialectic, continued with enough honesty and enough company, goes somewhere.
The next essay addresses the narrative problem — why the other side has had a better story, what the left’s story has gotten wrong, and what a story that people can actually hear might look like. Because the argument and the evidence and the institutions are not sufficient. They require a story.
A note on this project and its limitations, stated plainly because plainness is what the argument requires.
This series has gaps. Yawning gaps. Some of what is in those gaps will have been filled, by the collaboration that produced it, with whatever was most available rather than most accurate — the quotable over the rigorous, the digitally native over the deeply considered, the zeitgeist over the evidence. Fisher comes up a lot. There are thinkers who should come up more and don’t. The canon this project reaches for is partly a function of what has been most discussed in the text the AI was trained on, which is not the same thing as what is most important or most true.
Three defences, stated without apology.
First: it is quick to market. The alternative to imperfect public thinking is no public thinking, which is not an improvement.
Second: the collaboration genuinely broadens both parties. Ground has been covered here that neither would have reached alone. That is worth something even when the coverage is uneven.
Third: any old shite is better than the doomscroll. The walking dialectic that this blog attempts — start from where you are, ask the questions, confound where necessary, rinse and repeat — produces some shite. It also produces something. The ratio is, on balance, acceptable.
The conversation is the point. The gaps are real. Help us fill them.
Next: Essay Nine — The Narrative Problem. Why neoliberalism had a better story, what the left’s story has gotten wrong, and what a narrative that people can actually hear might look like.
The manifesto these essays argue toward — Listen to Me — is on this blog. The gaps in these arguments are real and acknowledged. If you see them, say so. The conversation is the point.

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